

Georg Cantor, Kurt Gödel, and the Incompleteness of Mathematics

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Outline

- 1 Set Theory
 - Naïve Set Theory
 - Infinite Sets
 - Russell's Paradox
- 2 Formal Systems and Gödel's Theorem
 - Formal Systems
 - Gödel's Theorem
- 3 Insanity

What is a Set?

- A set is a collection of objects, denoted $S = \left\{ 1, \nabla, E, \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \right\}$
- The objects within a set are known as elements, and are denoted $1 \in S$ or $2 \notin S$
- If every element of T is an element of S , then $T \subseteq S$
 - How many subsets does a set with n elements have?
- The empty set with no elements is denoted \emptyset . $\emptyset \subset S$ for every set S
- Union of sets is denoted $A \cup B$; intersection is $A \cap B$

Category of Sets

- A function $f : A \rightarrow B$ between two sets A and B specifies an element $f(a) \in B$ for every $a \in A$
- How many functions are there from a set A with n elements to a set B with m elements?
- The *category* of sets consists of all the sets together with all set functions
- An *isomorphism* (or bijection) between two sets A and B consists of:
 - Two functions, $f : A \rightarrow B$ and $g : B \rightarrow A$
 - Such that $f \circ g = 1_A$ and $g \circ f = 1_B$
- Isomorphism partitions the sets into classes, called *cardinal numbers*

Cardinal Numbers

- Every natural number $(0, 1, 2, \dots)$ is a cardinal number
- What about infinite sets? Are they all isomorphic?
 - $\mathbb{N} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$
 - $\mathbb{Z} = \{\dots, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, \dots\}$
 - $2\mathbb{Z} = \{\dots, -4, -2, 0, 2, 4, \dots\}$
 - $\mathbb{Q} = \{1/2, 68/37, 4/5, \dots\}$
 - $\mathbb{R} = \{1, e, \sqrt{5}, \dots\}$

Cardinal of the Continuum

- Georg Cantor proved that the natural numbers \mathbb{N} are *not* isomorphic to the real numbers \mathbb{R}
- The argument is called *Cantor diagonalization*. Take any function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. Then:
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 - But try listing out all the real numbers $f(n)$ in decimal form:

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- The cardinal of \mathbb{R} is denoted c , and called the cardinal of the continuum

Infinity of Infinities

- Cantor diagonalization can be used to prove a more general fact
- Let S be a set and 2^S be its *power set*, the set of subsets of S
- Let $f : S \rightarrow 2^S$ be any set function. Then construct a subset $T \subset S$ according to:
 - If $s \in f(s)$, $s \notin T$
 - If $s \notin f(s)$, $s \in T$
- Then $T \neq f(s)$ for any $s \in S$
- This means the cardinal of 2^S is greater than the cardinal of S , for any S

Infinity Can't Be That Easy

- Let $S = \{\text{sets not containing themselves}\} = \{x \in \text{SET} \mid x \notin x\}$
- Does S contain itself?
 - If $S \in S$, then $S \notin S$
 - If $S \notin S$, then $S \in S$
- Put another way: a barber shaves every man in his town who does not shave themselves. Does the barber shave himself?
- This is *Russell's paradox*. It shows that naïve set theory is inconsistent.

Zermelo-Frankel Set Theory

- Set theory is the foundation of all mathematics. It must be made consistent
- The Zermelo-Frankel (ZF) axioms fix Russell's paradox
- Key idea: build a *universe* of sets in stages: sets, sets containing sets, sets containing sets containing sets, ...

Axiom of Choice

- ZF set theory is often endowed with an additional axiom: the axiom of choice. It becomes ZFC set theory
- The axiom of choice says that, given a collection of sets, it is possible to choose a single element from each set
- Does this seem reasonable?

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 - Well-ordering theorem: every set can be ordered in such a way that every subset has a least element
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 - You can win an infinite hat game
- However, AC is also essential for many fundamental results in mathematics. So we keep it in.

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 - Syntax: rules for forming expressions, called well-formed formulas (wffs)
 - Semantics: rules for understanding a given expression
- Some examples:
 - basic logic (propositional calculus)
 - first-order logic (predicate calculus)
 - Peano arithmetic

Propositional Calculus

- Syntax:
 - Variables A, B, \dots refer to true (T) or false (F)
 - Symbol $\neg A$ refers to the negation of A
 - Logical connectives: $A \vee B$ (A or B), $A \wedge B$ (A and B), $A \implies B$ (A implies B), $A \iff B$ (A iff B)

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- Semantics:
 - Build up the truth value from the individual pieces. Example:

A = it is raining today

B = everyone showed up for this class

C = Donald Trump is the President of the United States

$(A \vee C) \wedge (B \implies (\neg A \wedge C)) \wedge (C \iff A)$

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- Predicate calculus uses expressions like this to better capture “things” and relations between them

Predicate Calculus

- Predicate calculus can use *quantifiers* to make statements about collections of things
 - $\exists \rightarrow$ there exists
 - $\forall \rightarrow$ for all
 - Example: $\forall x(Cx \implies \exists y(L(y, x)))$, where
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 - $C(x)$ is a predicate symbol meaning x is a country
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- Sentences in predicate calculus generally can't be evaluated on their own
 - *Models*: interpretations of variables and predicate symbols
 - Example model: domain = {Donald Trump, United States, Botswana},
 $C = \{\text{United States, Botswana}\}$, $L = \{(\text{Donald Trump, United States})\}$
 - Is the above sentence true or false relative to this model?

Practice

- Translate the following sentences into predicate calculus:
 - In every school, there is a bully.
 - If it is raining here, then it is raining in every adjacent city.
 - The best dog is a labrador.
 - Students who get As become lawyers.

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- Predicate calculus is great! Can it express everything?

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- Spoiler: **you can't**
 - Löwenheim-Skolen Theorem: if a theory has an infinite model of cardinality λ , it has models with every cardinality exceeding λ
 - In plain English: if you try to use predicate calculus to pin down the real numbers, you'll inevitably include things you didn't intend
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- Takeaway: logic has its limits. How deep are they?

Interlude: Peano Arithmetic

- The Peano axioms are an attempt to formalize arithmetic on natural numbers, using 0 and S , the successor function (+1)
 - (S1) $\forall x(S(x) \neq 0)$
 - (S2) $\forall x\forall y(S(x) = S(y) \implies x = y)$
 - (A1) $\forall x(x + 0 = x)$
 - (A2) $\forall x\forall y(x + S(y) = S(x + y))$
 - (M1) $\forall x(x \cdot 0 = 0)$
 - (M2) $\forall x\forall y(x \cdot S(y) = x \cdot y + x)$
 - (IS) For any formula ϕ , $(\phi(x) \implies \phi(S(x))) \implies (\forall x(\phi(x)))$

Gödel Numbering

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- So: can we translate logical statements about arithmetic into numbers?

Gödel Numbering

- Yes, via Gödel numbering:
 - Associate to each symbol of the system a natural number. For example:

$()$	$0S$	$\neg\forall$	$\wedge \implies$	$\iff \forall$	$\exists =$	\dots
12	34	56	78	910	11...	

- Given a formula, such as $\exists x(S(S(x)) = S(S(S(S(0))))$):
 - Convert each symbol to its number: 10 12 1 4 1 4 1 12 2 2 11 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 3 2 2 2 2 2
 - Use these as exponents in a prime factorization:

$$2^{10}3^{12}5^17^411^113^417^119^{12}23^229^231^{11}37^4 \times \\ 41^143^447^153^459^161^467^171^373^279^283^289^297^2$$

- Prime factorizations are unique, so every formula gets a unique number

Gödel Numbering

- How about proofs?
 - A proof is a sequence of formulas $\phi_1, \phi_2, \dots, \phi_n$, such that each statement follows from the previous one.
 - Associate to each statement its Gödel number $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n$
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- Now we can build predicates on natural numbers that tell us about the structure of logic
 - Let $G(\phi)$ denote the Gödel number of the sentence ϕ
 - Let $f(x, y)$ be the Gödel number of the formula obtained by replacing occurrences of z in the formula labeled by x with the number y
 - Let $\Gamma(x, y)$ indicate that y is the sequence number of a proof ending in the statement with Gödel number x
 - Difficult exercise: translate the following (true) claim into English:

$$\begin{aligned} & \exists x(x = G(\phi) \wedge \exists y_1(\Gamma(G(\phi), y_1)) \wedge \exists y_2(\Gamma(G(\neg\phi), y_2))) \\ & \implies \forall x(\exists y(\Gamma(x, y))) \end{aligned}$$

Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem

- Consider the formula $\neg\exists y(\Gamma(f(z, z), y))$; there does not exist a proof of some statement (the statement numbered by z with occurrences of z replaced by z itself)
- Let the Gödel number of this be i
- Consider the formula $\neg\exists y(\Gamma(f(i, i), y))$ with Gödel number j . Note $j = f(i, i)$
- If the underlying formal system is consistent, this last formula is not provable. Proof:

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 - Then $\Gamma(j, k)$ holds, which means $\Gamma(f(i, i), k)$ holds.
 - But then $\exists y(\Gamma(f(i, i), y))$...so the system is inconsistent, a contradiction.

Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem

- Now consider the opposite sentence, $\exists y(\Gamma f(i, i), y)$
- This is also not provable. Proof:
 - Suppose it is provable. Then $\Gamma(j, k) = \Gamma(f(i, i), k)$ can't hold for any k
 - Thus, for every number k , $\neg\Gamma(f(i, i), k)$ is provable
 - But this contradicts the sentence itself, $\exists y(\Gamma f(i, i), y)$
- Conclusion: there is a sentence such that neither it nor its negation is provable. This sentence is *undecidable*.

Implications

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 - One example: Diophantine solvability. Can a given equation be solved in integers?
 - Cool example: mortal matrices. Can a given set of matrices be multiplied in some order to give the zero matrix?

Big Example: Continuum Hypothesis

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- A natural question: is there a cardinal in between?
- Georg Cantor believed the answer to be no, but couldn't prove this
- Not his fault: in 1963, the continuum hypothesis was proved to be undecidable in ZFC set theory

Cantor's Insanity

- Cantor spent his life in this world of infinity confusions
- The cause, nature, and extent of his mental disorder are not readily apparent, but:
 - He definitely suffered from bipolar disorder
 - He was ostracized from mathematics, largely by Kronecker, which didn't help matters
 - He was the first person to see some of the most mind-boggling facts in mathematics, which definitely didn't help matters




Figure: Georg Cantor,
1845–1918

Gödel's Insanity

- Mathematics was considered the most unimpeachable, unassailable discipline for millennia
- Gödel watched this entire house of cards fall
 - Always a quirky character: citizenship debacle
 - Developed an irrational fear of being poisoned towards the end of his life
 - Eventually starved himself to death




Figure: Kurt Gödel, 1906–1978